EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON OFFERS OF
SETTLEMENT: A PRELIMINARY
REPORT
THOMAS

D.

ROWE, JR.,* WITH NEIL VIDMARt

I
INTRODUCTION

This paper reports on results from the early stages of an ongoing
empirical study of the "offer of settlement" or "offer of judgment" device.
Emphasis on and controversy over encouraging settlement in civil litigation,
along with interpretations and proposed (but withdrawn) amendments of
Federal Rule of Civil Pro'cedure 68 on offers of judgment, have underscored
the potential of this procedural tool. We have little systematic knowledge,
however, about what effects the offer of settlement device might actually have
in the different contexts in which it could be used and in the different forms in
which it could be cast. The present study attempts to begin filling that gap
with reports on simulation research. In the future, we hope to continue our
efforts with experimentation on actual disputes.
Our report begins with a description of the background against which the
study, takes place-the existing rules and current issues concerning possible
changes. It describes the promise and dangers of offer devices and the
potential significance of empirical research in this field. It then turns in Part II
to a description of our study-its design and the hypotheses to be tested. We
report in Part III on findings from simulations using Duke University law and
business students and Washington University law students. The report
concludes in Part IV with discussion of the policy implications of our findings
if they were to be borne out by more extensive research, and with mention of
possible later and more complex stages in the research and more advanced
hypotheses that might also be tested in these phases.
A.

Setting

1. Rule 68 and the American Rule on Attorney Fee Liability. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, along with many parallel state rules, provides that if a
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defendant offers to have judgment entered against him, the plaintiff does not
accept, and the plaintiff's judgment is not more favorable than the offer, then
the plaintiff must pay the defendant's post-offer costs.' The effect is to
reverse the usual rule that a losing party must pay the winner's costs; the
baseline for judging who "won" for purposes of entitlement to costs rises
from zero to the amount of the defendant's offer. The mandatory phrasing of
the rule also eliminates the court's normal discretion not to award costs to a
prevailing party.2 "Costs" in this country, however, are often little more than
nominal, and in particular under the decisional "American rule" do not
usually include attorneys' fees.' Thus, the normal impact of a Rule 68 offer,
and consequently the rate at which defendants have used the Rule, have not
been great.4 Several developments, however, have combined in recent years
to raise the visibility of the device.
2.

The Controversy over Encouraging Settlement.

Concern over rising caseloads

has led to increased focus on and encouragement of settlement. Greater
judicial fostering of settlement has been one of the hallmarks of "managerial"
judges' procedural activism, 5 and the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16 on pretrial conferences gave legitimacy to such judicial
efforts by adding two mentions of settlement to the text of the Rule." The
1. Federal RUIC of Civil Procedure 68 reads in full:
At an' line more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may
serve upon the adverse parts- an olfer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending
party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then
accrued. If 'within 10 days after the service of the oiler the adverse party serves written
notice thai the ofler is accepted, either party may then file the ofler and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An
offer not accepted shall be deemed withdras n and evidence thereof is not admissible except
ti a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained bv the offeree is not
mote favorable than the offer, the oflicree must pay the costs incurred after the making of
the offer. TIhe fact (lat an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subseqtuerit
offe,-. When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or
judgment, but the amotint or extent of the liability remains to be determined by Further
proceedings, the part\, adjudged liable may make an ofler ofjudgment, which shall have the
same effect as an ofter made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than
10 (Iays prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount of extent of
liability.
FF0. R. CiV. P).68.
2. On the application of Rule 68, see generally, e.g.. Note. Rule 6S.1 .Vew Toolfm Ligatio,
1978 DUKE L.J. 889, 889-93.
3. On costs in general, see 10 C. WVRItCii, A. MIL.ER & IM. KANE. FED.RAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 2665-79 (2d ecd. 1983): ot the American rule against fee shifting generally and
exceptions under federal law, see id. § 2675.
4. See. e.g., Committee Note, Peiminan Draft oJ Proposed .-fmedments to the Federal Rides of Civil
Pocedure, 98 F.R.I). 339, 363 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Pretimmar Draft].
5. See generallY, e g.. Sympositm, Litigaom 1amagemeit. 53 U. Cin. L. REx'. 305 (1986).
6. FEi. R. Cix. P. 16(a) (In an. action, tle court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties and any unreptresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before
trial, for such purposes as . . . (5) facilitating the settlement of the case."); FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c) ("The
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the
possibilit' of settlement or the use of extrajtudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.
): see Ei).
R. (ix. P. Advisorv Cottmmitee's note to 1983 amendments:
Clause (7) explicitl\ recognizes that it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at
pretrial conferences. Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results in savings
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idea of encouraging settlement has been both enthusiastically embraced as a
necessary response to court congestion and litigant intransigence, and
strongly criticized for running risks of compromising judicial neutrality,
forcing abandonment of legal rights, and reducing judicial articulation of
important public values. 7 More effective forms of the offer of settlement rule,
which works without judicial involvement (at least until after judgment), could
be an attractive way to gain the benefits of promoting settlement without
some of the costs-if forms of the rule can be devised that do not entail too
many problems of their own.
3.

Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule 68.

In 1983 and 1984, the federal

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed amendments to Rule 68.8 Many
of the details of the proposals are not relevant here, but both versions
involved key changes that are the basis for our first simulation. With the aim
of improving both the fairness and the effectiveness of the Rule, the revisions
would have (1) made the offer device available to plaintiffs as well as
defendants, and (2) added attorneys' fees to the costs for which a party
declining an offer of settlement under the Rule could be liable. The
proposals aroused a good deal of criticism," and the Committee has
apparently shelved the topic, at least for the time being.' Part of the reason
for the opposition was concern about the possible impacts of the proposed
changes; the concern may be well founded, but at present it rests on
theoretical analysis and informed practical speculation rather than empirical
research. In some cases even the direction of likely effects from changes in
the Rule is uncertain; and even when little reason exists to doubt the directionl,
the magnitude of the impacts may be unknown. This magnitude could be
significant for policy decisions about the desirability of amendments. Our
first simulation therefore uses variations on the Advisory Committee's
proposed changes with two-way and fee-affecting characteristics.
to the litigants and thejudiciai systeii, settlement should he facilitated at as early a stage of
the litigation as )ossible. Although it is not the pitt pose of Rule 16(b)(7) [sic
Ito impose
settlement negotiations on tnwillilg litigants, it is believed that providing a netutrail lh tint
for discissing the subject itight lostet ii.
7.

For the leading criticism of settletitent

see Fiss,

gInt' stSetthmeni, 93 YALE I.J. 1073 (1984).

For a response and Fiss" reply, see \icilheitia & Shaller, lo Reconilia/io. 94 YA LE L.J. 1660 (1985):
Fiss. Out of Eden, 94 YALE L..J. 1669 (1985). See also Macklin. Promoting Seltemeni. Ioregoing /he Facts. 14
N.Y.U. RExV. . & Soc. CHANG;E 575 (1986) (stressing social values of judicial factfinding and
questioning whether alternative dispuie resolution and promoting settlement excessively reduce
[actfinding). For a survey of attittides abhou t judicial roles and techniques in connection with
settlement, revealing genetally avorable viewss. see \V. BR ZIL, SIE' itiNG CIVIL SUITS: IrIGATORS'
VIEws ABOUT A''ROPRIATE ROiES AN) EiFECiVE ITECINIQUES FOR FEDERALJUnGES (1985).

8. 1983 Preliminao,
Draft.suia note 4. 98 I.R.D. at 361-67; Ihetimoio'y Drji q/ Proposed
.Amendments, 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-37 (1984).
9.

See. e.g.. Burbank, Proposa to .'4mentd Ride 68-Ti me to.-Ibandon Ship. 19 U. Mlici.JI.. REF. 425

(1986); Simon. The Riddle of Rhie 68, 54 GEo. \,\sI. 1. RE~V. I. 10-19 (1985). Among the objections
Most vigo rousi Urged were that tile
prop)sals were too severe iii their likely effects ott plaint ill's; that
they ran counter to cottgr essional l)olicy itt feder al fee shiftinig laws; and that tihe exceeded ihe
rttlemakers' athority Under the Rules ELabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
10.

See Simon, sup

note 9, at 24 n.142.
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4. Recent Decisions. Another development that occurred in the 1980's to
increase the prominence of the offer device was the decision of two Supreme
Court cases involving Federal Rule 68. The first, Delta Air Lines v. August, I
turned on a fairly fine point of interpretation, holding that a complete victory
for a defendant does not trigger the Rule's mandatU costs award because
such a case does not come within the Rule's language requiring a "judgment
• . .obtained by the offeree" (plaintiff). As a result, the courts retain their
usual discretion in deciding whether to award costs. Both the majority and
dissenting opinions, however, did emphasize the Rule's goal of promoting
settlement. 12
The Court's more significant decision four years later in Ilarek v. Chesnv'v
has drawn considerable attention14 and affords the basis for one of the
simulations reported on later in this article. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 ("section 1988")' ' provides for the award of attorney fees
to a prevailing party in federal civil rights actions "as part of the costs." .Mlarek
held that the reference to "costs" in Rule 68 includes attorney fees awardable
under section 1988; consequently, a federal civil rights plaintiff who declines
and fails to improve on a defendant's Rule 68 offer loses the usual entitlement
to recover post-offer fees. Afarek failed to present the issue whether a
plaintiff's entitlement is not merely neutralized, but reversed, with such a
plaintiff becoming liable for the defendant's post-offer fees. The leading lower
court case on that point since Alarek, Crossman v. Alarcoccio, held that "Rule 68
can never require prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to pay defendants' post-offer
attorneys' fees.'' 0 Without taking any position on the legal or policy
desirability of the various approaches, our second simulation tests for
different effects of the three main possible rules: leaving the plaintiff's section
1988 fee entitlement unaffected by an unbeaten Rule 68 offer; neutralizing
the entitlement; and reversing it.
5.

Commentary About Offer Devices.

Among the sources available to those

discussing the proposed Rule 68 amendments and the Supreme Court rulings
was a considerable literature in legal and economic publications, some of it
commentary on the amendments or the decisions themselves.' 7 Other works
of a more theoretical nature have attempted to use economic analysis to
I1. 450 U.S. 346 (1981).

12.
13.

Id. at 352 (Stevens, J.): id.a( 380 (RehnquisJ., dissenting).
473 U.S. 1 (1985).

14. See, e.g., Simon, The .Vew .lleaning oJ Rule 68. Marek v.Chesn\ and Bevond, 14 N.Y.U. RE'v. 1.. &
Soc. CHANGE 475 (1986).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
denied, 107 S. Ci. 1955 (1987). See also Hopper v.
16. 806 F.2d 329, 334 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir. 1989) (when iiial court declined to

award attorney fees to defendant under section 1988, fees "never became a part of the costs to I)e
awarded tinder Rule 68").
17. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9; Oesterle, Proposed Rule 68 on 0/fes o Selllentent, CORNEI.L I..F.,
Feb. 1984, at 11; Simon, sqpra note 9; Simon, supa note 14; Note, supra note 2; Toran Sell/enenl,
Fres Compatrig Euglish Payment into Coul and Piuoposed Rule 68, 35 AMt. U.I.. RFv.
Sanctions. and. Il/aoruev
301 (1986); Note, 0ffer of.Judgmenl and Statutor il.Iuti//iozed .t/one Fees: 1 Ret'onciliation oJ the Scope
and Popose of Rute 68. 16 GA. .. REv. 482 (1982).
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predict the likely effects of offer rules entailing greater consequences than
existing Rule 68.18 These writings have raised issues and developed
hypotheses that our empirical research attempts to explore and test.
B.

Potential Benefits and Problems of Offer Devices

Offer devices are especially interesting, and empirical research on them is
potentially quite significant, because the devices present such a complex
mixture of possible benefits and dangers. That combination poses challenges
both for research and for the rulemaker's craft, and we hope in later stages of
our research to test rule forms drafted in light of the results of our present
study. To avoid getting ahead of the story, however, we summarize here the
basic types of foreseeable benefits and problems.
1. Possible Benefits. Formal offer of settlement rules affecting liability for
post-offer attorneys' fees may have significant "smoke-out" effects, eliciting
realistic settlement offers early by giving parties a potential gain (fee recovery

or avoiding fee liability) from making such offers to offset any possibility of
appearing weak in negotiations."I

Similarly, they give the other side an

incentive, the threat of fee liability or losing fee entitlement, to take such
offers seriously rather than simply holding out for something better. The
result, even if the effect is not to make parties more likely to settle, could well
be that cases that were going to settle anyway settle sooner-with faster relief'
for those suffering legal injury and transaction cost savings for litigants and
2 11

the system..

Second, offer devices affecting liability for post-offer fees should give
parties with strong claims or defenses, who otherwise might have to yield
more in negotiations than the merits seem to warrant (because of the threat of
21
unrecoverable fees), an effective way of countering groundless opposition.
Offer devices may thus discourage both efforts to force "discounting" of

strong claims and attempts to stand on nuisance claims for their settlement
value. Third, offer rules may help fulfill a goal of remedial law, full
compensation of injured plaintiffs. Rather than being limited to damages
minus a large attorney's fee, a party with a strong claim who makes a

reasonable, early offer seems likely to get an early settlement with relatively
little fee expense or a judgment including a fee award. Similarly, a defendant
18.

See, e.g., J.

SIIAPARD.

IIIE INFLUENCE OF RULES RESPECTING RECOVERY OF ArI-ORNEYS

'

FEES ON

Procedle e, in "lii ECONoMIC
SEITLFEMENT OF CIVIL. (ASES (1984); Bowles, Ectnomic ts/pecs of LeI
APPROACH 10 LAW 191. 197-201 (198 1); Cooter. Marks & NInookin. Baigaining in the Shadow nJthe Law
A' lestable Model ofStialegic Behavio, II J. LEGAL. S UD. 225 (1982); Miller, - Economic .n/lysis
of Ride

68. 15J. 1. GAL STUD. 93 (1986); Oesterle. supra note 17; Phillips & Hawkins. Some Econioiic .lspels oj
the Settlement Process: .A Study of Peisolial Inqur Claims. 39 Moo. L. RE:V. 497 (1976); Priest. Reg-nlatiig the
Content and I 'alime of litigatio. .In Economic A nalisis. I Sui,. Cr. EcON. REV. 163 (1982); Rowe,
Predicting the AJeirts ofIttloirey Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoNir;MI. PROBS., Vinter 1984. at 139. Rather
than attempt to summarize the points in these several works here, we cite specific portions when theyare relevant to particular hypotheses.
19. See, e.g:. Cooter, Marks & Ninookin, supa nole 18. at 244-45.
20. See. e.g., Rowe, supia note 18, at 166-69.
21. See id. at 169.
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for expenses suffered because of a plaintiff's

2. Dangers and Problems. Offer devices also pose problems that no
responsible discussion can overlook. First, the positive "smoke-out"
phenomenon that may accelerate settlement seems inseparable from a
potential "dig-in" effect, which will sometimes make agreement less likely if
the parties do not settle after making formal offers. The very reason why it is
attractive to make an offer is that it improves the offeror's expected outcome
from trial-fee recovery if the adversary rejects the offer and does not
improve on it. With the expected outcome from trial improved, of course,
trial itself is less to be feared if the other side does not accept the offer; the
formal offer provision thus may harden positions.2 2
Second, fee-affecting offers may be a powerful weapon against the riskaverse, because they can introduce the possibility of substantial loss or at least
large reduction in recovery where none existed before. A large employer
defending against a discrimination claim or an insurance company
representing the defendant in an ordinary tort case, for example, might "lowball" a claimant with an ungenerous offer. Then even the fairly small chance
that a verdict will come in below the offer, and be largely eaten up by the fees
of the defense counsel (or worse, be exceeded by defense fees, leaving the
plaintiff with a net loss), might drive an underfinanced claimant to accept
much less than the likely fruits of trial. 2 3
Third, offer rules may undercut the goals of congressional fee award
statutes by reducing the encouragement Congress meant to give plaintiffs. 2-1
A holding that under Aarek civil rights plaintiffs not only lose their
entitlement to post-offer fees if they fail to improve on a rejected offer, but
also become liable for defendants' fees, would probably disadvantage a
strongly risk-averse group-individuals with discrimination claims. It could
thus inhibit significantly the pursuit of civil rights claims, a questionable effect
for a procedural rule in light of Congress' substantive concerns underlying
both the civil rights acts and section 1988.'5
This background-the setting and the pros and cons of offer devicesunderscores the potential significance of empirical data on the workings and
impact of offer rules. Of course, normative factors will and should play a
22. See Priest, supro note 18, at 169-71: Rowe, supra note 18. at 166-68.
23. See Rowe, sotpra note 18. at 168-69. The uncertainty that plays on risk aversion derives partly
from the fact that verdicts in the same case from diferent triers will vary over a range of prohahle
oitcomes. |o reduce both strong impacts due to risk av ersion and unfairness due to i andom
fluctuations, oler rules could 1)rovide for fee liability only if the olleree not only failed to improve on
the oler bum the judgment did not come within a certain range of it. A plaiiill re iccing a
defendant's ofler of $20,000, for example, might have to improve not on tile offer hut on., say, [he
ofler minus 25% or $15,000. Similarly, a defendant rejecling a deiand of'$15,000 might need only
a judgment tinder $20,000, (he offer plis one-third, to avoid fee liability. For siml)licity, om r
simulations included no such cushions., but we do not mean to prejudge these draIling issues.
24. Simon, oupra note 9. at 14-15.
25. Rowe, The Supreme Coi / on ..ltortey Fee Awordi. 1985 attd 1986 Tems: Economics. Ethirs, anid Ex
.nle .'alysis, I G:o. J. L.iGAL g''ruics 621. 626 (1988).
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major role in policy decisions whether to adopt or modify such provisions; but
far too often we know next to nothing about how great or little a difference
such changes would make. More broadly, scholars have noted for decades the
dearth of empirical work on the effects of attorney fee shifting, -6 and results
bearing on such questions as the strength of risk aversion among parties of
certain types could have import for litigation finance issues beyond the field of
offer devices.

27

II
DESIGN AND GOALS OF THE STUDY

A.

Research Design

For this first phase of the project, we ran two fairly simple simulations on
student populations. The subjects received hypothetical factual situations and
basic explanations of the workings of the types of offer rules involved. 2 Each
student received a series of three variations under the same basic fact pattern,
with a different rule type and offer level under each scenario. The subjects
were asked in each case whether they would accept the other side's offer and,
if not, whether they would at that point make a counter-demand and if so for
how much. The student populations used consisted of law and graduate
business students at Duke University and law students at Washington
University in St. Louis. 2 9 The grant for the research from the National
Institute for Dispute Resolution made it possible to pay respondents $10 or
$15 for a completed questionnaire; most students were not required to take
part but given the chance to do so for a modest payment, which eliminated
26.

See, e.g.. McCormick, Comnsel le.l
F and Othe Ixpen.e.s of Lilgalion as ati Element ?f Damages. 15

MINN. L. REV. (i19, 642 (1931): Sands, ft/omnes" Fees as Reroveiable Costs, 63 A.B.A. J. 510, 515 (1977).

For a recent exception reporting on it study of filings in three
somewhat suipriising conclusion that the availabilitv of fee awards
little effect on filing rates flo- constititional tort cases. see
Co?s/ittiionial l t/ Li igiatioI.The Iliiheniicf
-I/ic1101J'Fees S/aIt/t
CORNELL L,.R :\. 719 (1988).

federal districts and reaching the
under section 1988 may has'e had
Schwab & Eisenberg, t'.plaiing
aPd the G0 ,m'e
tI(is Defendan. 73

27. See, c.g, Rowse..cutra note 18. at 158-59 (discussing efiect of risk avcrsion on likelihood of
settlement under fee shifting).
28. This cxperimental design may lead to results that exaggerate [lie effects of ofler ritles
becacise the design requietCs that the subjects receive an explanation of the des ice-which emphasizes
it and may foctis theii thinking on it more than would he the case in actual litigation with all its
complexities. In reality, despite tite possible gailus ftoi'n lising the rule, parties i y simply overlook it
some amount of the ttie. Thus, this phMsC of out research may suffer rom the problem of
highlighting a key independent variable, with possible resulting increases in eftects on the dependent
v-aria )les. \VC hiope in Iater work, with more complex simulIations or cxperientis on acitual disputes.
to enhance realism by making the offer rules iore a part of the general hackground, rather than
Underscoring ihen as seems unavoidable at this stage.
29. We are especially graeftul to Professor Roy Siton of' the law fatulhv at Washington
Universirs for his cooperation i) administering the sinulalio us to StCteits ther e. We also appreciate
coninicnis and suggestions on the research design and eairlier drafts of this report Froin rmenibers of
al advisory group fr the sttcd\: Stephen Burbank Avery Katz. Laura Macklin. lhonias Metzlofl.
Michael Metirer, (;eolli-ev Miller, Dale Oesterlc,.Judith ResnikJohn Shapard. Ros Simon. and lanice
['I)1rr1. Arts errors that renaii Ire ours.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 4

any ethical issues of compulsion but may conceivably have introduced some
3
self-selection bias of uncertain direction in the samples.
To explain the design in slightly more detail: After the common
introductory material and hypothetical fact pattern, each research instrument
contained three different combinations of offer amounts and rule types to
which students were asked to respond. Offer amounts were at three specific
levels, which can be generically labeled low, medium, and high. Similarly,
rule types were of three kinds, involving minimum, intermediate, and
maximum consequences. Hence there were nine possible scenarios, of which
each subject received three; the combinations and orders were systematically
scrambled in an effort to minimize priority effects.3 1 Thus, if the low,
medium, and high offer amounts are abbreviated as 1, 2, and 3, and the
minimum-, intermediate-, and maximum-consequence rule types as A, B, and
C, one subject would receive scenarios A1, B2, and C3; another would receive
B 1, C2, and A3; a third would receive C 1, A2, and B3; and so on. Running all
combinations, as we did, without duplicating rule type or offer level for the
same respondent yields thirty-six different forms of the survey instrument.3 2
The first simulation involved an ordinary personal injury tort claim in
which students (some law, some business) were asked to imagine themselves
in the role of the plaintiff. Liability was not an issue, but damages were
contested. The amounts being offered by the defense in the various scenarios
under this simulation were $30,000, $35,000, and $40,000. The minimumconsequence offer rule was no formal provision at all-which leaves intact the
American rule, with no prospect of fee recovery either way. (For simplicity, in
all questionnaires non-fee "costs" were stipulated to be negligible.) The
maximum-consequence version provided for full liability for the defense's
reasonable post-offer attorney fees if the plaintiff declined and failed to
improve on the defendant's offer. Under this rule the plaintiff could also
make a counter-demand with the same effects in reverse. The third,
intermediate-consequence version was based on a proposal by John Shapard
of the Federal Judicial Center for a "benefit-of-the-bargain" approach; " in
brief, a party whose rejected offer was not bettered at trial would be entitled
to some benefit but not full recovery of all reasonable post-offer fees. Such a
30. The exception was the group of )uke gradiate business sttidents, all of whom completed
the questionnaire without payment as part of a class exercise. For their assistance in arranging the
administration of the simulation to this gronp, we are grateful to Professor Blair Sheppard and
Jonelle Roth of the Fuqua School of Business.
31.
1 his design makes it possible toi check for these priority eflects-whcther respondents'
answers vary in any' systematic ways with the order iii which they encountered scenarios in their
questionnaires. We have run some statistical tests for such effects and fotnd none that are
significant. Suggestions ofp)ossible patterns do appear from the raw figures, such as a slightly higher
acceptamce rate iin the last scenario in a qucstionnaire: hot ill addition to not being statistically
significant at the .05 level in aggregate data, this tendency is not uniforin among the subject
pol)(lations taken separately. (For a bricf explanation of'statistical significance, see nfia note 43.) In
this report, therefore, all data are aggregate within sample populations, making no differentation for
response order.
32. Sample forms of the survey instrunerts are available fiom Professor Rowe, who will be glad
to help atnycone interested iin replicating existing or Iti tute simulations.
33
See J. StLs',sRi), supra note 18, at 53-55.
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party could elect the more advantageous of the trial verdict or (in the case of a
3 4
defendant) the offer minus reasonable post-offer fees.
In the second simulation, the hypothetical situation involved a civil rights
suit against police for several claims arising out of a mistaken-address drug
bust; subjects (all law students) were asked to play the role of plaintiffs'
counsel.3 5 The basic questions asked, however, remained similar: Would you
advise acceptance now; if not, would you advise a counter-demand, and in any
event for how much? The offer levels were $6000, $13,000, and $20,000.
The rule types were the three main possible variations on the actual situation
under section 1988 and present Federal Rule 68, which only defendants may
invoke: leaving a federal civil rights plaintiff's fee entitlement unaffected;
neutralizing it as in Afarek v. Chesny ;:Th and reversing the entitlement to provide
for fee recovery by defendants. In both simulations the initial offer levels
were meant to be realistic given the facts, and they indeed turned out to cover
spans in which acceptance rates ranged from zero or quite low to fairly high or
100 percent.
B.

Hypotheses and Questions

These simulations lend themselves to testing three main hypotheses about
expected impacts of offer of settlement rules affecting liability for attorney
fees, compared to regimes under which settlement offers and demands can
have no such effect: (1) higher rates of acceptance of initial offers; (2) higher
rates of plaintiffs making early counter-demands under a two-wav offer rule,
but not under a one-way rule, if the initial offers are not accepted; and (3)
moderation of amounts in counter-demands. To elaborate somewhat on each
of these, a plaintiff facing an offer that threatens to impose liability for postoffer defense fees should be more likely to accept that offer than he would be
under a rule without such a consequence, because (if the offer is at all within
the likely range of trial outcomes) it worsens the plaintiff's expected net from
trial. To put it another way, the potential liability created by the formal offer
rule should make the same offer relatively more attractive and thus more likely
34. For example. suppose a defetidant makes a otfinal offer of $35.000. plaintiff declines, and
the vCrdict is $30.000. If the delense's reasonable posi-ofler fees are $10,000. the dctendant can
choose to pay $25.000-the offnr minits the fees: hence the beiclit-of-the-bargain label, since the
defendant was willing to part with S35,000 and does so by pa ying $25,000 and being out $ 10.000 in
unreinibursed fees. At verdict levels below $25,000 in this illustration, the defenclat would choose
to pay simply the verdict 1am1ot1nt. This vCIrsion has lesser consecfiueiices than the "plain vanilla" ftill
li tbility rule, tucller which the plaintiff"s 'erdict would lwas be reduced by the defendant's
reasola ble plost-ofter fees. T'his irile [%Zpe also includes a parallel benelit-of-the-bargain allowance
for a i- jected and tnbeaten p/at
demad, with the plaintiff ableIto choose cither the verdict oo
the one hand or. oo lie other, the lemacd aniotut phis reasonable post-denandCees.
35. As in tlie firstsimulation, soine liabilits was conceded (fOr tiilawftil search, becaise of the
address mistake) bit camange aountnls wet-e at is sue, as were major claiis of'false arrest and untiitive
damages because of .a deflese 0f excessive resistance. This article the'efore does not deal with
sittiationis involvinig liclidlteCd dalmlages but contested liabilitys. wsheic oflericiRles could be expected
not to wvork well and exteptions Or Judicial discretion might be needed. For disccissiono tOfhis
problem see Rowe,siipr, note 18, at 166-67 & n.I 19.
36. See snp1) Iext accompanying notes 13- 16.
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to be accepted. 3 7 This hypothesis thus looks to the possibility that "low-ball"
defense offers will have greater impact against plaintiffs under a formal offer
rule.i8
The second hypothesis-that of higher rates of making early counterdemands under a two-way rule if the offeree does not accept an initial offerinvolves the expected "smoke-out" effect. '' t Without an offer rule and thus
with no way of gaining a favorable fee shift by making a settlement demand,
plaintiffs have less reason to make one. Some should be more likely to hold
out without engaging in any back-and-forth, at least in the fairly early stages
of litigation postulated in the simulations. Adding the possible benefit of fee
recovery should lead to some increase in the tendency to make counterdemands early. The two different situations used in this study permit a
comparative test of this hypothesis: In the first, one "rule" is no fee-affecting
offer rule at all, while the other two rules provide for formal plaintiffs'
counter-demands. The second situation involves one-way rules exclusively.
Thus, in the first situation there should be a "smoke-out" effect under the two
offer rules compared to the no-offer rule, while in the second there should be
no resulting differential effect among rules, unless the expectation-lessening
impact of a defendant's offer under the formal offer rules elicits more early
counter-demands.
Third, the same incentive of possible gain from making a counter-demand
should affect the amounts demanded. A plaintiff can plausibly expect to
benefit from triggering fee liability in case of non-acceptance only if the
formal demand is within the realistic range of likely outcomes. Without the
chance of fee entitlement, however, some plaintiffs are likely to see less reason
not to hang tough in initial exchanges, particularly for fear of appearing weak
and setting too low a starting point for bargaining. This hypothesis thus
relates to the expected effect of eliciting "reasonable" offers,-' which may be
measured by the relative incidence of high outlying counter-demands and
perhaps also by the mean amounts of counter-demands. The predicted result
in the tort hypothetical is a lower rate of high outlying demands and a lower
37. This predicted effect is ntot the same as expecting an overall increase in tie rate of
settlement. The simulations tested only lot initial acceptance; because they were not interactive and
iterative, thev can y.ield no iniloimation a)0out sett lenict likelihoods after initial r/eclion. Indeed,
because of the possible "dig-in'" effect, see snpra text accompanying note 22, there is some reason to
expect lower settlement rates after initial rejections than if' no fee-affecting ofFer rule applies.

Interactive simulations or actual cases wotld be necessary to test for the "dig-in" effect and for nel
impacts on the overall rate of settlement.
The prediction in the text would not hold in the case of a , isk-neutral offeree who could make a
counter-demand that might create liability for attorney fees. Unless the offer were attractive enough
on its own, such a party should see and act upon the possibility of offsetting a defendant's
improvement in expected trial outcome b\ making a Rule 68 cocnter-demand. But the simulation
situations both involved supposedly risk-averse plaintiffs, who should be driven toward acceptance by

the wider uncertainty created by a defendant's offer; and the second situation (civil rights), based on
the existing, One-way Federal Rule 68, provides no way for a plaintiff" to make a formal counter-

demand affecting fee liability.
38.

39,
40.

See sup/P text accompanying note 23.
See sp/rPa text accompanying notes 19-20.
See sun(a text accompanying note 19.

Page 13: Autumn 1988]

OFFERS OF SETr'LEMENT

mean amount demanded under the two rules providing for formal plaintiffs'
counter-demands than under the no-offer rule. 4 '
The simulation results may also make it possible to explore various
questions about which it is often hard to formulate hypotheses in advance.
Given the three-by-three matrix of increasing offer amounts and offer rules of

lesser to greater consequences, we may be able to discern relative impacts of
changes in the offer amounts and rules; one or the other might appear

dominant, or the two might both seem to have considerable effect. The
limited samples and number of offer levels used in our simulations so far, of
course, preclude generalization at this stage; but if after more research rule
effects were virtually always to appear relatively small, for example, the policy
implication could be that the main ground for debate over such rules should
be equity considerations rather than incentive effects. Similarly, it may be
possible to compare the strength of impact of different rules, as with the
intermediate benefit-of-the-bargain approach and the maximum-consequence

full liability version in the first simulation. Finally, measurement of the gaps
between initial offers and counter-demands could suggest some impact of

initial offer levels on the amounts demanded-whether, for example, a fairly
low offer seems to influence bargaining limits by eliciting low demands, or
rather broadens them by making plaintiffs feel they must ask more to offset
what looks like a hard bargaining position on the other side.
III
RESULTS

We ran our simulations on five student populations during the academic
year 1987-88. Those receiving the tort situation were second-year Duke law
students, second-year Washington University law students, and Duke
graduate business students in a part-time program for those currently
employed. The civil rights case was given to second- and third-year Duke law
students (with no overlap between the first and second groups of Duke law
student subjects) and Washington University law students, most of whom
were late in their first year, along with a few second-years who had previously

completed the tort situation questionnaire. The number of responses
received from the various populations ranged from thirty-five to sixty-six, with
response rates easy to reckon in some cases and harder in others. The Duke
law students received the questionnaires in individual mail folders; 33 percent
41. A complicating factor, however, makes it diflticult to be sure of the source of this result and
to compare results under the tort and civil rights scenarios: Plaintiffs in our simulations, when
considering how much to oifer, werc not making the initial bargaining move btt were responding to
defendants' offers-which, under the two oflet rules, lowered the plaintiffs' expected net outcome
from trial. Therefore, at least some demand moderation Under offer rules in both the tott and civil
rights simutlations may have resuhleld from the effect of def endants' offers on plaintiffs' expectations.
1o test lot ofier or demand moderation clue to the possible improved chances of fee recovery alone.
it would be necessary to sttudy inuial oflers or demands rather than the coutler- moves elicited in otli
simttlations. We are indebted to Jo hn Shapard of the Federal Judicial Center for pointing ott, somne
of these implicatious of the effect of defcndants' initial offers on plaintills' expectations and likely
demand levels.
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responded in one case and 27 percent in the second. The Washington
University law students were invited to remain after class, and we do not have
the numbers who chose to leave or not to complete the questionnaires. The
Duke graduate business students filled out the questionnaire in class (and
received no payment, unlike the others), so the response rate in that group
was 100 percent.
A.

Tort Simulation

The results from the tort simulations appear in Tables 1 through 4 in the
Appendix. Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the results from the Duke University
law, Washington University law, and Duke University graduate business
students respectively; Table 4 aggregates the data from the three populations.
The questionnaires contained minor variations because of our accumulating
experience and the need to adapt to local differences, but the forms remained
identical in their essential details. For the tort simulations, the offer amounts
were $30,000, $35,000, and $40,000; the rule types were none, benefit of the
42
bargain, and full fee shifting.

Relating the results to the hypotheses, we find that in the aggregate data
(Table 4) there is some increase in the overall rate of acceptance of initial
offers as the offer rule goes from none (31.7 percent) to intermediate (benefit
of the bargain-39.6 percent) to full (41.0 percent). It is not, however,
statistically significant, with a chi-square probability of greater than .25 for the
relationship between offer rule and acceptance rate. 43 1 A different grouping of
the data yields some higher suggestion of significance: If the subjects did not
view the two offer rules as meaningfully different, but perceived that having
some rule versus none could have a differential impact by creating the threat
of any fee liability, it can make sense to group the two rule versions. When
the "benefit" and full rules are combined, the difference between their 40.3
percent acceptance rate and that of 31.7 percent under no offer rule is
marginally significant (less than .10).
The need to treat these results with caution becomes apparent when we
examine the data for each subject group separately. All of the several
probability figures for the relation between offer rule and acceptance rate42. See supra note 34 and text accompanying notes 33-34.
43. For those who are not used to dealing with statistical significance in legal writing, a hrief'and
non-mathematical explanation may be in order. The "'chi-square" procedure measures the
likelihood that an observed pattern could be caused by random variation rather than by a true
relationship between the factors. Chi-square probability figures run from 0 to I and, in the
applications here, express the likelihood that a statistical relation between independent and
dependent variables is due to chance. The higher the probability figure, the more likely the results are
due to chance.

By convention, figures of .05 or lower-one chance in twems that the result is

fortuitous-are widely accepted as reflecting statistical significance. Probabilities of .01 or lower, for
which the phrase "significant at the .01 level" is sometimes used, are generally regarded as showing
even greater statistical significance. A figure of'.10 may suggest that the relationship yotU think N.ou
are seeing is the real thing, but so1 shouldn't take it to the bank.
The statistical programs used for this paper are mainfiame SAS version 5.18 and PC SAS version
6.03. For assistance in the statistical work we are grateful to Bruce Burcheti, a J.D. candidate at
)uke, and for data tabulations to Julia Burchett of the )uke law class of 1985.
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even combining the "benefit" and full rules-are above .15. Among the
Washington University law students, as Table 2 reflects, the type of offer rule
appears to have played no regular role in influencing acceptance rates, which
were marginally lowest under the intermediate "benefit" rule (31.3 percent,
compared with 32.8 percent under no offer and 40.6 percent with the full
offer rule). Moreover, the acceptance rate under the full offer rule in this
population was higher than under the other two rules at two of the offer levels
($30,000 and $40,000) and lower at the third ($35,000), which strongly
4
suggests random fluctuation given the fairly small numbers.
Within the individual samples, the Duke University law students (Table 1)
showed some tendency to accept offers at the lower two levels more under the
offer rules than with no offer rule in force, which could suggest the
effectiveness of "low-balling." The same impact appears in most but not all
cases among the Duke business students (Table 3). Again, in this tort
simulation with the Washington University law students (Table 2), however,
no statistical significance showed up for any rule effects. Variations are
evident within that group, but they are unsystematic enough to afford a
textbook example of when statisticians would warn lay persons to draw no
conclusions.45
44.
1he pattern inlTable 2 could be consistent with the following explanation: With acceptance
rates under the Full ofler rule markedly lowest at the medium $35,000 ofler, sone respondents may
ha e had a sense that the ofltr rule gives good leverage to try for a worthwhile small increase over
the defendant's offer. At the $40,000 level, by contirast, there could be a stronger sense of doing
rather well alreadv, along with doubt about ability to get much more. One individual questionnaire
Siilikingly illustrates this possibility: With no offer rule, the student accepted the low $30,000 offer,
citing the likelihood of having to wait a long time foi trial. In the ver next scenario, the same
respondent rejecled the $35.000 offer under the full offer rule, speaking of the good chance of a
vetdict in the range of $40,000 to $60,000 (given in the facts) and also of recovering fees. Finally,
under the intermediate "benefit" rule, the student accepted the $40,000 offer because there was
"'little chance of doing much better" and a risk of losing fees.
The contrast with another questionna ire in the same Washington University law student group,
however, serves to caution against hasty generalization and to illustrate sonie sources of variation in
the data. This sttident, who may not have understood the rule because he or she would have made
no Rule 68 couinte,-otflcis despite their potential benefits, would have accep/ed only the $35,000 offer,
which happened to he under no offer iule: the response cited tfe likely time to trial in case of
rejection. Rejectiug the $40,000 off'tr under the "benefit" rule, the respondent cited the "'great
enough" chance of winning, which scents to reflect low risk aversion.
Il'e etnphasis in these two questionnaires oil the danger of waiting a long tine lotr trial
uinder no
ofler rule, leading the scubjec ts to accept off'eis lower than others thev rejectcd when sone ofltcr rule
did apply, suggests Ifat a somewhat paradoxical effect may occasionally arise with respect to timing
of settlement. In theory, forital offer devices affecting liability for post-offer fees should often
accelerate settlements. See spma text accompanying note 20. But sometimes, these two
questionnaires suggest, the presence of the device may make it more attractive to try some
bargaining, when otherwise the lick of bargaining leverage would have led to imutediate acceptance.
Of' Course, this Cflct may not dominaic in the aggregate; there are two ways not to bargainacceptance or flat rejection-and tfte latter is likely to make the case take even longer. Moreover, it
can serve justice if I)eople do not have to accept what they regard as bad offers simply because
otherwise the\ would sutffcr too nmuch from delay. Still. focusing ott the time factor, these
questionniaircs bring ott how giving litigants an attractive new toy is likely in some instances to make
them spend ttle playing with it. Because our simulations callefd for only a single set of responses
and did not involve a hargainng process ovser tine, testing such possibilitics will have to await later
research.
45. lThe lack ofstatistical signilicance in some of these data does not hold with respect to effects
iont the shecri al ltt
i ofttc'he offer. Oftcourse. it is to hIecxlf)ctcd that tite higher the offer, the more
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The second hypothesis related to the "smoke-out" effect of eliciting early
counter-demands. Subject to some caveats, there seems to be a degree of rule
effect noticeable here. First, we are dealing with a reduced sample, since the
relevant subgroups include only those respondents who said they would
decline the defendant's initial offer. Second, large majorities within those
subgroups make counter-demands under any rule; at least three-quarters in
every scenario in every population said they would make a counter-demand
once they rejected the initial offer. With the strong tendency to make
counter-demands in any event, the observable differences in the counterdemand rate under the various rules are small.
Still, in two of the three groups and in the aggregate figures some
distinctions do appear. Given the possible benefit of a favorable fee shift,
under both versions of offer rules all of the Duke law students, and all but one
of the Duke business students, who rejected the initial offers said they would
make a counter-demand at this point. By contrast, at each of the three offer
levels a small fraction of those samples under the no-formal-offer regime said
they would not make any counter-demand. There was, however, no regularity
on this matter among the Washington University law students. A comparison
of the counter-demand rates under no offer rule and the combined rates
under the "benefit" and full offer rules revealed that the rule influence was
statistically significant in both Duke populations at least at the .05 level, but
because of the small sample sizes involved these results must be interpreted
with caution.
More importantly, aggregating all three populations (of which the
Washington University group was the largest-sixty-six versus thirty-seven
and thirty-eight in the Duke law and business groups respectively), the
counter-offer rate was 85.3 percent under no offer rule and 92.2 percent
under the "benefit" and full offer rules combined. Even with the large and
non-confirming group included, the difference between these two
percentages approached significance at better than the .10 level. Going out
on a limb, we can say that there seems to be some marginal "smoke-out"
likely it will be accepied: if no such result appeared, one would question the rationality of the subject
populations or tile
design of the survey instrument. In all three samples, although acceptance rates
diverged fairly widely, there as indeed quite regular increase in aggregate acceptance rates as ofer
amounts rose; and despite the smallness of the samples, for the most part similar regular increases
appeared even under each distinct rule type. In all of the tests we have run checking acceptance rate
by offer amount, the statistical significance is high (< .01). In this tort simulation, as opposed to the
civil rights situation. ofler amount appears to have been easily the single largest influence on
acceptance rate. Indeed, in tie Washington University law student group, offer amount seemed to
be virtually or totally dominant in determining acceptance rate.
Professor Roy Simon of' Washington University School of Law, who administered the
questionnaire to student groups there, and Professor Rowe have discussed the lack of relationship
between ofler rule and acceptance rate in the responses of the Washington University law student
group that answered the tort questionnaiire. Especially since the group behaved rationally in other
respects (higher acceptance rates with higher oflers) and showed some rule efletts (significantly
lower counter-demand amounts under offer rules), and since the other Washington University law
student group that answered the civil rights questionnaire showed significantly increasing acceptance
rates as offer rule consequences became greater, we are ata loss to explain the lack of eflect for offer
rule on acceptance rate in the first Washington University student sample.
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effect on early offers from the existence of an offer rule that creates a
possibility of fee recovery.
The final hypothesis concerns the amounts counter-demanded and
whether they would be somewhat moderated by the availability of offer rules
extending the possible benefit of a favorable fee shift. We have looked at both
the mean counter-demand amount and the incidence of high outlying
counter-demands-those of $60,000 or higher (that figure representing the
top of the range in which all students were told there was a good chance of a
verdict). Both measures provide strong confirmation for this hypothesis,
quite markedly when we take the three groups in the aggregate and to a
considerable extent when the populations are treated separately. For the
three groups together, the mean counter-demand under no offer rule was
$56,345, and $48,562 under the two offer rules. The percentage of high
outliers under no offer rule is 40.7 percent, but under the offer rules is only
9.8 percent. Both differences are significant at the .01 level.
Taking the three samples separately, in all possible instances the mean
counter-demand under no offer rule was higher than that under the two offer
rules combined; often the chi-square probability was at or near significant
levels. Similarly, the percentage of high outlying counter-demands for all
three groups was over 20 percent under no offer rule, and considerably lower
under the offer rules. Significantly, in the Washington University sample,
which had shown little if any response to the offer rules in its decisions
whether to accept and whether to make a counter-demand, the effects of
moderation of counter-demands were especially pronounced, with the largest
decreases in any of the three groups both in average counter-demands and
high outlying percentages. In sum, the expected incentive effect of some
moderation on many subjects seems to be strongly confirmed. Of course, by
no means do all subjects decide to start high under no offer rule, or refrain
from high counter-demands under offer rules; but in our samples, having the
offer rule available to plaintiffs does appear to have encouraged "reasonable"
counter-demands.
B.

Civil Rights Simulation
We present the results from the civil rights simulations in Tables 5 (Duke

law students), 6 (Washington University law students), and 7 (totals) in the

Appendix. With the exception of some variations in introductory materials
because of local conditions, the questionnaires were identical. For this
situation the offer levels were $6000, $13,000, and $20,000. The rule types
all involved the interaction of existing Rule 68 and civil rights attorney fee
awards under section 1988. The first rule had no effect on a prevailing
plaintiff's entitlement to post-offer fees (the position the Supreme Court
rejected in Afarek); the second neutralized that entitlement (the result in ,Varek
and AIarcoccio); and the third made the plaintiff liable for the defendant's
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reasonable post-offer fees in unbeaten-offer cases (the rule in no jurisdiction
that we know of, but argued for unsuccessfully by the ilarcoccio defendants).46
Especially striking about the results from this situation is the presence of
marked rule effects on the likelihood of acceptance of the defendants' initial
offer, in contrast with the tort hypothetical. In each sample and in the two
samples combined, a comparison of all three rules separately and a
comparison of the minimum-consequence rule with the two fee-affecting rules
together reveal that the relationship between rule type and acceptance rate is
always significant at the .01 level. This result, involving a simulation with
rules having more clear-cut and perhaps more severe consequences, provides
support for the first hypothesis that the threat of an adverse fee shift should
increase the acceptance rate. Unsurprisingly, the offer amount still correlates
strongly with acceptance; but here the rule effect is also pronounced and quite
regular. In an analysis of scenarios under the same offer amount with
different rule types, the acceptance rate almost always rises with the
progression from minimum- to intermediate- and maximum-consequence
rules; the only variations are minor and appear insignificant.
Three effects apparent in these data with respect to acceptance rate seem
especially noteworthy. First, there does appear to be a significant difference
in effects between the intermediate- and maximum-consequence offer rules,
which did not occur in the tort simulation. The distinction in consequencessimple inability to collect your own fees versus having to pay the other side's
as well-is sharp and easy to grasp, perhaps unlike the more complex
"benefit-of-the-bargain" rule as contrasted with the "plain vanilla" offer rule
in the first situation.
Second, the effects on increasing acceptance are particularly strong with
the combination of higher offer and stronger-consequence rule. Acceptance
rates with the highest offer but minimum-consequence rule stayed below 42
percent; but in one sample with the medium offer and the maximumconsequence rule, and in both with the highest offer and intermediate- or
maximum-consequence rule, the acceptance rate ran at least 58 percent and
under one scenario in one sample was 100 percent. There may thus be a
synergistic effect, strongest at upper levels, when the offer amount and the
severity of the rule consequences rise together. Third, the data provide some
indication that severe offer rules may enhance the acceptability of "low-ball"
offers to risk-averse plaintiffs. No plaintiff in either sample would accept the
$6000 offer under the minimum- or intermediate-consequence rule, but one
or two in each sample did under the stiffest rule. In one sample there was a
quite high (58.3 percent) acceptance rate for the mid-level $13,000 offer
under the maximum-consequence rule.
As for the second hypothesis, concerning the tendency to make counterdemands or hold out, and the amounts counter-demanded, this simulation
did not involve a two-way offer rule that plaintiffs could use with respect to
46.

See generallv sulpra text accompanying notes 13-16, 35-36.
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their own settlement demands. Consequently, no variance by rule type is
predicted. Some variations in the counter-demand percentages do appear
(for example, combining both samples, 67.7 percent under the minimumconsequence rule and 72.8 percent under the other two together), but they
are not statistically significant. The inclination to make counter-demands is
fairly high-50 percent or above in every possible scenario in both
populations-but fluctuates almost randomly with rule type and offer level.
Mean counter-demands, however, were notably lower ($43,230) when
plaintiffs were threatened with possible neutralization or reversal of their
section 1988 fee entitlement than they were under the rule interpretation
leaving that entitlement unaffected. The mean counter-demand under that
rule was $51,872, and the difference was significant at the .05 level. 4 7 High
outlier counter-demands (defined for this simulation as at least $75,000, the
level at which subjects were told ajury "just might" return a verdict) were also
less frequent under the neutralizing or reversing Rule 68 interpretations11.1 percent versus 23.3 percent under the no-change approach; the
significance level again was less than .05. Offer rules may thus moderate
plaintiffs' counter-demands whether the rules are available to both sides or to
defendants only. From our limited data, however, we see signs of a significant
"smoke out" effect on early plaintiffs' offers only in the tort simulation under
the rule available to plaintiffs as well as to defendants. 48 This effect is
consistent with our original hypothesis."
IV
CONCLUSIONS

A.

Policy Implications

At this preliminary stage, we must approach circumspectly even a brief
discussion of potential policy implications of our work. Much more extensive,
complex, and realistic research remains to be done before we can speak with
some confidence of empirical knowledge about the effects of offer devices. Of
course, valuejudgments must also play a role in decisions concerning whether
47. For one possible explanation of this demand-moderation effect even without the benefit of
triggering a rule addressed to plaintiff ' fee entitlement, see supra note 41: In or civil rights
simulations, defendants had made offers that adverselv affected plaintiffs' expected net gain from
trial, %%,hichwill tend to reduce counter-demands. In more general terms, plaintiffs who reject offers
but face fee conse(fuences-even when their own offers have no formal effect on fee liability-are
likely to feel greater Jpcssure to settle and thus to make lower counter-demands.
48. See supra text following note 45.
49. At the end of our introductory discussion of' hypotheses for testing, see sn/pa text following
note 4 1, we mentioned possible effects for which it seemed hard to formulate hypotheses in advance.
The only one that we have not vet discussed in our presentation of results concerns the impact of
initial oiler levels on amounts of counter-demands. Plaintiffs might, for example, either demand
more in response to a low offer in an effort to maintain room to bargain, or on the contrary- demand
less in an attempt to keep settlement chances alive and perhaps because the initial offer aflected their
sense of what their own case was worth. In aggregate data mean counter-demands tended to rise
slightly with higher offers. but the many' irregular variations among scenarios within individual
groups suggest the need for larger samples-and especially' for research involving practitioners,
rather than students, before an\ conclusions would be warranted.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 4

to change existing offer rules. Subject to these severe limitations, it may still
remain possible to suggest some policy applications that our early findings
could have if confirmed by further research. With respect to the relative
acceptance rate under regimes with and without offer rules affecting liability
for post-offer fees: Small or non-existent differential impacts (like those in
our tort simulation) suggest that choices between different possible regimes
should rest primarily on a sense of equity rather than on hypothesized
incentive effects. It is easy to overdo an ex post sense of fairness and not to
pay enough attention to ex ante incentive effects; , 0 but if incentive effects are
small or absent, then ex post considerations have the field more or less to
themselves.
The two simulations used in this study provide good illustrations of
possible lesser and greater impact differences, and thus of the conceivably
different terms in which policy questions in this field might be approached.
There appeared to be no significant differences in effect between benefit-ofthe-bargain and full fee shifting rules in the first simulation. The policy
implications could go in either direction, depending on values and other
research results: Possibly, the "benefit" version is simply too complicated for
most litigants and even their lawyers to grasp readily, and therefore should
not be adopted. On the other hand, with moderate experience parties and
especially attorneys might catch on; if effects still are quite similar under both
versions, then the choice should be guided by ex post notions of fairness and
how rigorously a litigant should be treated after declining and failing to
improve upon a formal settlement offer. But when the impact seems quite
marked-as with the different civil rights offer regimes studied so far in our
limited research-that result might join with equity concerns to suggest that
the maximum-consequence rule is unnecessary to achieve significant incentive
effects. Such a strong impact could even, depending on its magnitude, raise
questions about the consistency of the measure with congressional intent in
passing the fee'shifting statutes.
Often our research results show the need for further work more than they
support an), present policy implications. Such appears to be the case with the
modest confirmation of the increased-acceptance, "smoke-out", and demandmoderation hypotheses in our preliminary data. These effects, even if
confirmed with needed additional work directed at the same hypotheses, are
only part of the picture. They could mean more and earlier settlements, which
would be widely although perhaps not universally regarded as a benefit. But
even putting aside issues about the general desirability of settlement, 5j the
possible "dig-in" effect requires broader and more complex research to see if
it is possible to reach any conclusions about net impact on settlement rates.

50. See generally Easterbrook, The Supreme Corl. 1983 Term-Foewod: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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Further Research and Advanced Hypotheses

The simulation research reported here is a valuable first step and might
profitably be repeated, especially on populations with more real-world
experience such as litigating lawyers. But several additional steps remain
before the indications from the present work can be treated as anything more
than highly tentative. Further studies can profitably use two-sided interactive
simulations, rather than one-sided questionnaires; interactive situations could
be between two persons or two lawyer-client teams, or perhaps could involve
a computer on one side for regularity. In either case, specifically drafted rules
rather than the general descriptions used thus far would be essential-and
would be valuable to perfect drafting for real-world applications as well as to
inject verisimilitude. And, of course, an ideal experiment would involve rule
variation on a significant flow of similar actual cases, which might come from
cases voluntarily referred to Duke's Private Adjudication Center or to another
alternative dispute resolution program.
Such advanced research would make it possible to test more complex
hypotheses, including even some fairly fundamental ones about litigant
behavior beyond specific issues concerning offer of settlement rules. On the
impact of offer rules, many more questions would lend themselves to testing,
such as the timing of settlements and the amounts at which parties settle. An
issue beyond the impact of offer rules is whether-effects on settlement rates
aside-fee shifting would raise or lower the level of expenditure on
litigation.52 Lawyer time spent under different offer rules might be a good
proxy measure.
Recent theoretical literature has also contained discussion of the relative
51
roles of "optimism" and "strategic behavior" models of litigant behavior.
Briefly, the optimism model hypothesizes that litigant decisions whether to
settle or go to trial depend primarily upon expectations of the net result of
trial versus the settlement terms available. The strategic behavior model
proposes that in seeking to maximize gains, parties may take chances on hard
bargaining that will sometimes take them to trial even when the optimism
model would predict settlement.5-t Without going into great detail here,
suffice it to say that different fee and perhaps offer regimes might permit
testing to determine which model more fully accounted for observed
behavior.55 If we can achieve a fraction of this research agenda, we can
consider ourselves fortunate.

52. See Katz, .leasurig the I)emaiidjor Ilitigaiio: Is the English Rite Realiy Cheper?. 3 J. 1., EcoN. &
ORG. 143 (1987).
53. Com143
(
e rubek, Sarat, Fclstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs
of Oidinai" Litigation, 31
UCIA L.. REV. 72, 104 (1983) (discussing opliiuisii and strategic behavior models), with Cooter,
Marks & Ninookin, supra note 18, at 246 (proposing empirical test of strategic behavior model in
ditftercnt ice shifting situations).
54. For a concise discussion of how strategic bargaining can lead to trial rather than settlement,
see R. CooTER & F. UEtrN, lAW AND ECONOMICS 487-92 (1988).
55. See Cooter, Marks & Ninookin, snpra note 18.
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TABULAR APPENDIX

Explanation of Tables. The following tables present the statistical results
from our simulations: Tables 1 through 4 from the tort scenario described in
the body of the article, and Tables 5 through 7 from the civil rights
simulation. Tables 4 and 7 give aggregate data for groups doing the same
simulation, and the others present results by individual groups. The first line
on rule type states the kind of offer of settlement rule applicable in the various
scenarios, using shorthand references to the descriptions in the text-in
Tables 1 through 4, these references include situations using no offer rule, the
benefit-of-the-bargain version, and the full-liability approach.* In Tables 5
through 7, the rule headings refer to interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 that would leave a federal civil rights plaintiff's section 1988 fee
entitlement unaffected, neutralized, or reversed, respectively.** With the
offer amounts in the left-hand column, the tables thus present three-by-three
matrices for the various effects in each of the nine possible combinations of
rule type and offer amount, with totals at the side and bottom.
The rows under each offer amount, after giving the total number ("N") of
responses under each rule type, first give the percentage of subjects who said
they would be inclined to accept or would advise accepting the defendant's
offer now. The next pair of rows gives the number of subjects rejecting the
offer and the percentage of those subjects who would be inclined to make or who
would advise making a counter-demand now. The final row under each offer
amount gives the mean amount counter-demanded under the various rules.
The lines under the total figures at the bottom of each table first give the
percent of subjects accepting under each rule type. The remaining lines give
in turn the number rejecting initial offers and the percentage of those subjects
who would make immediate counter-demands, the mean amounts counterdemanded, and the percentage of counter-demands regarded as high outliers
(at least $60,000 in the tort simulation and $75,000 in the civil rights
simulation).
The footnotes to each table give statistical significance for some of the
relationships presented in the table. The "p" is the conventional symbol for
reporting probability levels. The ">" and "<" symbols signify whether a
probability level is greater or less than the figure that follows; again, the higher
the figure, the ore likely the results are due to chance-i.e., lower figures mean
greater statistical significance. In most cases, the comparisions are of
differences between the minimum-consequence offer rule on the one hand
and the medium- and maximum-consequence rules taken together on the
other, thus permitting contrast between the effects observed under offer rules
with some impact on fee entitlement or liability versus rules with no such
impact.
*
*

Seei si)ra text acompanying notes 33-34.
See

na text ac o(nl)allying

(otC36.
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TABLE 1
GROUP

1:

TORT, DUKE UNIVERSITY UPPERCLASS LAW

Offer rule type

None

"Benefit"

Full

Total

Offer amiount
$30,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand;

14
7.1%
13
92.3%
$50,936

12
16.7%
10
100.0%
$46,000

11
27.3%
8
100.0%
$49,688

37
16.2%
31
96.8%
$49,022

$35,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Mean counter-demand'

10
10.0%
9
77.8%
$54,286

12
41.7%
7
100).0%
$54,286

15
20.0%
12
100.0%
$45,042

37
24.3%
28
92.9%
$50,0 19

$40,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand

13
53.9%
6
83.3%
$55,500

13
69.2%
4
100.0%
$46,875

11
54.6%
5
100.0%
$51,000

37
59.5%
15
93.3%
$51,429

Total

N
Acceptance rate"
No. rejecting

37
24.3%
28

37
43.2%
21

37
32.4%
25

111
33.3%
74

85.7%
$52,787
20.8%

100.0%
$48,929
9.5%

100.0%
$47,720
8.0%

94.6%
$49,862
12.9%

Counter-demand rate

Counter-demand rate'
Mean counter-demand
% high outliers'

'Comparisonof
Comparison of
Comparison of
l Comparison of
combined
Comparison of
size small).

between "None" and combined
between "'None' and combined
between "None" and combined
among "None, '.Benefit," and
/ > .15.
pBenclit"-'Fnll,"
diflerence between "None" an( combined
difference
dilflerence
dilterence
difference

"Benefit"-"Full', p > .25.
"'BeneIit"-"Full, p > .10.
"Benefit'-'Full", p < .10.
'Full'' p > .20: between "None" and
"Benefit"-"Full", p < .01 (but sample

Comparison of dillcrencc bet wccn "None" and com11bined lBcnelit"-Fill",/p < .05.

Comparison of difleren
size small).

cbetween 'None' and combined "Bencfit"--Full", p = .15 (and sample
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GROUP

2:
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PROBLEMS

2

TORT, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY UPPERCLASS LAW

Offer rule type

None

"Benefit"

Full

lotal

Offer amount
$30,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand"

22
9.1%
20
90.0%
$58,056

21
0.0%
21
100.0%
$49,810

21
33.3%
14
85.7%
$45,417

64
14.1%
55
92.7%
$51,686

$35,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

20
40.0%
12
83.3%
$58,000

23
43.5%
13
76.9%
$46,250

21
19.1%
17
76.5%
$52,536

64
34.4%
42
78.6%
$52,294

$40,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

22
50.0%
II
81.8%
$64,389

20
50.0%
10
80.0%
$52,500

22
68.2%
7
85.7%
$47,500

64
56.3%
28
82.1%
$55,848

Total

N
Acceptance rate"
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate"
Mean counter-demand'
% high outliers'

64
32.8%
43
86.1%
$59,581
54.1%

64
31.3%
44
88.6%
$49,449
15.4%

64
40.6%
38
81.6%
$48,922
6.5%

192
34.9%
125
85.6%
$52,764
26.2%

Comparison of dillerence between "'None" an(d combined
Comparison of difference between "None" and combined
Comparison of diflerence between "'None" and combined
Comparison of difference among "None." "Benefit," and
combined 'Bcnefit"-'Full.' p > .60.
Comparison of difference between "'None" and combined
Comparison of dilterence between "None" and combined
Comparison of dillerence between "None" and combined

"Benetit'-'Fill''. p < .05.

'Benet.Full'' p < .05.
"'Benefit"-"Full",p < .01.
"Full'*, p > .45; between "None" and
"'Bencfit'-Full", p > .90.
"Benefit"-'Full'. p < .01.
'Benefit'-till'. p < .01.
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TABLE
GROUP

3:

3

TORT, DUKE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BUSINESS

Offer rule type

None

"Benefit"

Full

lotal

Offer amount
$30,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Cournter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

$35,000

N
Acceplance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-deind rate

14
14.3 %
12
83.3%
$52,955

11
18.2%
9
100.0%
$45,778

13
30.8%
9
88.9%
$46,250

38
21.1%
30
90.0%
$48,732

10
40.0%
6

15
53.3%
7

13
69.2%
4

38
55.3%
17

83.3%

100.0%

100.0%

94.1%

Mfean counter-deiand'

$60,000

$46,429

$46,875

$50,78 I

$40,000

N
Acceptance ,ale
No. rejecting
Couniter-deniand rate
Mean counter-demand'

14
57. 1%
6
83.3%
$54,000

12
75.0%
3
100.0%
$55,833

12
50.0%
6
100.0%
$50,333

38
60.5%
15
93.3%
$52,82 I

Total

N
Acceptance rate'
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate'
Mean counter-demand'
% high Offtliers'

38
36.8%
24
83.3%
$54,881
40.0%

38
50.0%
19
100.0%
$47,605
10.5%

38
50.0%
19
94.7%
$47,750
5.6%

114
45.6%
62
91.9%
$50,284
19.3%

of difl'rence between "None" and combined
of ditf(rencc between "None" and combined
of diflt rence between "None" and combined
of di ftIrence among "None," "Benefit". and
combined "Benefit"--Full." p > .15.
Comparison of diffcrence between "'None" and combined
size siliall).
Comparison of dilfli cucc betwcei "None" and combined
C(omparison of difleiremcc between "None" and combined

Coiopariison
Conpari Son
Comparison
,d C(omparison

size small).

Benefit"-"Full'' p < .10.
''Benefit"-"Full", p < .01.
ppenefit'-'Full',
> .50.
'1 till",
p >

.40; between "None'" and

''Benefit.Full'' p < .05 (but sample
"Beneft-"Full, p < .01.
"Bencfit'-"F'll'. p < .01 (but Sample

36
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TABLE
GROUPS

1, 2, 3

Offer rule type

4

COMBINED: TORT, TOTALS

None

"Benefit"

Full

Total

Offer amount
$30,000

N
Acceptance rate

50
10.0%

No. rejecting

45

44
9.1%

45
3 1.1%

139
16.6%

40

31

116

Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand"

88.9%
$54,516

100.0%
$47,950

90.3%
$46,875

93. 1%
$50,183

$35,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand h

40
32.5%
27
81.5%
$57,273

50
46.0%
27
88.9%
$48,646

49
32.7%
33
87.9%
$48,783

139
37.4%
87
86.2%
$5 1,197

$40,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

49
53.1%
23
82.6%
$59,316

45
62.2%
17
88.2%
$51,667

45
60.0%
18
94.4%
$49,529

139
58.3%
58
87.9%
$53,803

Total

N
Acceptance rate"
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate'
Mean counter-demand'
% high outliers"

139
31.7%
95
85.3%
$56,345
40.7%

139
39.6%
84
94.1%
$48,867
12.7%

139
41.0%
82
90.2%
$48,240
6.8%

417
37.4 %
261
89.7%
$51,288
20.5%

Comparison of differrcnce between "'None" and combined
Comparison of diflerence between ''None" and combined
Comparison of dillerence between "None" and combined
Comparison of difference among ''None,. Benefit," and
combined "Benefit"-"Full." p < .10.
Comparison of diflerence between "'None" and combined
Comparison of difference between 'None" and combined
Comparison of dillerence between "None" and combined

'Benefiti-Full', p < .01.
"Benefit -'Full", p < 01
"Benefit"-'Full", p < .01.
"Full", p > .25: between "None" ard
"Benefit"-"Ful"', p < .10.
"Benefin'-"Full", p < .01.
"Benefit-''ull". p < .01.
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TABLE
GROUP

4:

5

CIVIL RIGHTS, DUKE UNIVERSITY UPPERCLASS LAW

Fee claim impact

None

Offer amount
$6,000
N
Acceptance rate

Neutralize

25
0.0%

21
0.0%

No. rejecting

25

Counter-demand rate

52.0%

Reverse

Total

20
5.0%

66
1.5%

21

19

65

61.9%

63.2%

58.5%

$57,304

$47,905

$37,053

$48,063

N
Acceptance rate

26
7.7%

16
25.0%

24
20.8%

66
16.7%

Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

79.2%

91.7%

89.5%

85.4%

$61,250

$36,375

$44,105

$49,472

$20,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

15
26.7%
11
100.0%
$44,091

29
75.9%
7
57.1%
$53,357

22
77.3%
5
80.0%
$47,500

66
65.2%
23
82.6%
$47,652

Total

N

Mean counter-demand"

$13,000

No. reject

g

12

66

Acceptance rate"
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate"
Mean counter-demand'
% high otrliers,

Comparison
Comparison
Comparison
Comparison
"None" and
Comparison
* Comparison
Comparison

24

55

66

66

39.4%

34.9%

27.8%

40
70.0%
$45,400
11.1%

43
76.7%
$41,383
15.2%

143
72.7%
$48,532
21.6%

9.1%
60
71.7%
$56,259
33.3%

19

of difference between "None" and combined
of cldilerence between "None" and combined
of dif erence between "None" and combined
of difference among "None..
Netitralize,"
combinecd "NeutraliZe"-"Rev er se",'"
p < .01.
of dilferenc e between "'None" and combined
of difl'-'rcn'e between "None" and combined
of differcric' betwcen "None" ,nd combined

"Neutralize"-"Reer se''.
"Neutralize"-"''Reverse",
"Neutralize"-"Reverse",
and "Reverse", p <

198

p <
p <
p >
.01;

.10.
.01.
.40.
between

"Neutralize"-"Reverse". p > .75.
"Neltira'lize"'-"Res erse", p < .01.
"Neut ralize"-"Reverse", p < .05.
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TABLE
GROUP

5:

6

CIVIL RIGHTS, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY FIRST YEAR LAW

Fee claim impact

None

Neutralize

Reverse

Total

Offer amount
$6,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand"

12
0.0 %
12
50.0%
$39,625

11
0.0%
11
72.7%
$37,273

12
16.7 %
10
70.0%
$44,833

35
5.7%
33
63.6%
$40,281

$13,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand

11
0.0%
II
72.7%
$40,682

12
8.3%
11
81.8%
$43,636

12
58.3%
5
60.0%
$44,800

35
22.9%
27
74.1%
$42,648

$20,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand'

12
41.7%
7
57.1%
$55,357

12
58.3%
5
60.0%
$49,500

I1
100.0%
0
-

35
65.7%
12
58.3%
$52,917

Total

N
Acceptance rate"
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate"
Mean counter-demand
% high outliers'

35
14.3%
30
60.0%
$43,683
0.0%

35
22.9%
27
74.1%
$42.130
10.0%

35
57.1%
15
66.7%
$44,821
0.0%

105
31.4%
72
66.7%
$43,317
4.2%

Comparison
Comparison
Comparison
Comparison
"None" and
Comparison
Comparison
Comparison

p >
of difference between "None" and combined 'Neotraiz,"-"Rever',
of difference between "None" and combined 'Neotralizc"-"Reverse", p >
of difference between "'None*' and combined "Neutralize"-"Rev ese'. p >
of diflerence among "None .. Neutralize," and "Reverse'. p < .01;
combined "Neuiralize'-"Rcvcrse', p < .01.
of difference between 'None" and combined "Neutralize"-"Reverse", p >
of diflrence between "'None" and combined "Neutralize'-"Revcrse. p >
ot'difierence between "None" and combined 'Neutrilize"-"Reseise".p >

.90.
.70.
.70.
between
.30.
.90.
.25.
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TABLE

GROUPS 4

AND

Fee claim impact

5

COMBINED:
None

7
CIVIL RIGHTS, TOTALS
Neutralize

Reverse

Total

Offer amount
$6,000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean counter-demand"

37
0.0%
37
51.4%
$51,243

32
0.0%
32
65.6%
$44,250

32
9.4%
29
65.5%
$39,554

101
3.0%
98
60.2%
$45,442

$13.000

N
Acceptance rate
No. rejecting
Counterr-deniand rate
Mean counter-demand'

37
5.4%
35
77.1%
$54,394

28
17.9%
23
87.0%
$39,848

36
33.3%
24
83.3%
$44,250

101
18.8%
82
81.7%
$47,169

$20,000

N
Acceptance rale
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate
Mean countert-demand'

27
33.3%
18
83.3%
$48,472

41
70.7%
12
58.3%
$51,750

33
84.9%
5
80.0%
$47,500

101
65.3%
35
74.3%
$49,457

Total

N
Acceptance rate'
No. rejecting
Counter-demand rate'
Mean conter-demand
% high oulliers

101
10.9%
90
67.7%
$51,872
23.3%

101
33.7%
67
71.6%
$44,082
10.6%

101
42.6%
58
74.17%
$42,228
11.6%

303
29.0%
215
70.7%
$46,769
16.0%

Conpatison
Comparison
Comparison
Comparison
"None" and
Comparison

of diflerence bet.ween 'None" and combined
of dillet'ence bctwccn "None" and combined
of dillerence between "None" and combined
of diflerence aniong "None ..
Neutralize,"
combined
talize"-Res
pNt< .01.
of difltfctce etween "None"
omined
ond

"Neutrlizc'--Reverse", p <
"Netutirlize"-"Rc'evrse", p <
"NCtralize"-"Reverse", p >
and "Reverse", p < .01;

.15.
.05.
.75.
between

"Nct talize"-"Revcse". p > .40.
Colpatison of ditffetrcjce between "Notie" and combined "Neutraize"-"Rxvel'SC",/p < .05.
Cotmparison of' ditfference btttcn "None- and ombited "Nentrvalize'-"Revcrse", p < .05.

